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Abstract. This paper presents a framework that enables au-
tonomous agents to dynamically select the mechanism they employ
in order to coordinate their inter-related activities. Adopting this
framework means coordination mechanisms move from the realm of
being imposed upon the system at design time, to something that the
agents select at run-time in order to ﬁt their prevailing circumstances
and their current coordination needs. Empirical analysis is used to
evaluate the effect of various design alternatives for the agent’s deci-
sion making mechanisms and for the coordination mechanisms them-
selves.
1 INTRODUCTION
Effective coordination is essential if autonomous agents are to
achieve their goals in multiple agent systems. Such coordination is
required to manage the various forms of dependency that naturally
occur when the agents have inter-linked objectives, when they share
a common environment, or when there are shared resources. To this
end, a variety of mechanisms have been developed to address the
coordination problem. At one end of the spectrum, there are social
laws [8] which are laid down, long-term rules that prescribe how to
behave in a given society (e.g., drive on the right-hand side of the
road) such that if all the agents adhere to the rules then coordination
should ensue. At the other extreme, there are a number of one-shot
protocols (e.g., the Contract Net [9]) that coordinate the short-term
activities of agents in order to accomplish a speciﬁc task. In-between
are mechanisms, such as Partial Global Planning [3], that enable the
agents to exchange high-level objectives in order to try and ensure
coordination over a range of activities on a medium-term time hori-
zon.
All of these coordination mechanisms have different properties
and characteristics and are suited to different types of tasks and en-
vironments. They vary in the degree to which coordination is pre-
scribed at design time, the amount of time and effort they require
to set up a given coordination episode at run-time, and the degree
to which they are likely to be successful and produce coordinated
behaviour in a given situation. In the majority of cases, these dimen-
sions act as forces in opposing directions. As observed by contin-
gency theory [5], coordination mechanisms that are guaranteed to
succeed typically have high set up and maintenance costs, whereas
mechanisms that have lower set up costs are also more likely to fail.
In short, there is no universally best coordination mechanism.
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In all of these cases, however, the choice of coordination mecha-
nism is something that the designer imposes upon the system at de-
sign time. While this may be sufﬁcient for predictable and stable en-
vironments, it is inappropriate in dynamic and open contexts because
there is no scope for changing or modifying the mechanism to ensure
there is a good ﬁt with the prevailing circumstances. In such environ-
ments, it is important that the agents have a variety of coordination
mechanisms, with varying properties, at their disposal and that they
can then select the mechanism which is most appropriate for the task
at hand. Thus for particularly important tasks, the agents may choose
to adopt a coordination mechanism that is highly likely to succeed,
but which will invariably have a correspondingly large set up cost.
Whereas for less important tasks, a mechanism that is less likely to
succeed, but which has lower set up costs, may be more appropriate.
Our long-term aim in this research is to develop agents that can
reason about the process of coordination and then select mechanisms
that are appropriate to their current situation. That is, the choice of
coordination mechanism is selected at run-time by the agents that
need to coordinate. This work advances the state of the art in three
main ways. Firstly, the very idea of letting the agents dynamically
select the coordination mechanism is an issue that has not explic-
itly been addressed within the ﬁeld of multi-agent systems to date.
Secondly, as well as identifying this new area, we present a formal
framework for capturing the reasoning processes the agents require
in order to perform in such a manner. Finally, we provide an empiri-
cal evaluation of the effect of such reasoning on both the individual
agents concerned and on the overall system.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following manner.
Section 2 describes the scenario we use to explore issues related to
the dynamic selection of coordination mechanisms. Section 3 details
the agents’ decision making processes and section 4 evaluates them
empirically. Section 5 relates our work to that of others and section 6
summarises our initial ﬁndings and highlights the avenues of further
research.
2 THE COORDINATION SCENARIO
Our exemplar domain takes the form of a grid-world in which some
number of autonomous agents (A
￿) perform tasks for which they re-
ceive units of reward (R
￿). Each agent has a speciﬁc task (ST
￿) which
only itcan perform; there are other tasks which require several agents
to perform them, called cooperative tasks (CTs). Each task has a re-
ward associated with it. Generally, the rewards for the CTs are higher
than those for STs since they must be divided between the coordinat-
ing agents. An example of a typical grid at one instant in time with
two agents, two STs and one CT is given in ﬁgure 1.
The agents move about the grid one step at a time, up, down, left￿
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Figure 1. A typical coordination world grid.
or right, or stay still. At any one time, each agent has a single goal,
either its ST or a CT over which it is coordinating. On arrival at a
square containing its goal, the agent receives the associated reward.
In the case of STs, a new one appears, randomly, somewhere in the
grid, visible only to the appropriate agent. In the case of CTs, a new
one appears, randomly, somewhere in the grid, but this is only visible
to an agent who subsequently arrives at that square.
If an agent encounters a CT, en route to its current goal (i.e., its
ST), it takes charge of the CT
4 and must decide on both whether to
initiate coordination with other agents over this task, and if so which
coordination mechanism (CM) it should use. In this context, each
agent has a predeﬁned range of CMs at its disposal. Each CM is pa-
rameterised by two key attributes: set up cost (in terms of time-steps)
and its chances of success. For example, a CM may take
￿ time-steps
to set up (modelled by the agent waiting that number of time-steps
before requesting bids from other agents) and have a probability,
￿,
of success (thus when the other agent(s) arrive at the CT square, the
reward will be allocated with probability
￿, with zero reward other-
wise). An agent may well decide that attempting to coordinate is not
a viable option, in which case it adopts the null CM (meaning the
agent rejects adopting the CT as its goal).
The agent-in-charge (AiC) of the coordination selects a CM and,
after waiting for the set up period, broadcasts a request for other
agents to engage in coordination. The other agents respond with bids
composed of the amount of reward they would require in order to
participate in the CT and how many time-steps away from the CT
square they are situated. Figure 2 gives the protocol the agents fol-
low at each time-step; it highlights the speciﬁc decisions which have
to be made (see section 3).
This initial presentation involves several simplifying assumptions;
in particular common knowledge, a deterministic environment and
straightforward coordination mechanisms. However, the framework
is also intended to be ﬂexible so that these and other assumptions will
be relaxed in future work.
3 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
This section formalises the decision procedures of the agents. To
study the average impact of coordination mechanisms, an inﬁnite
horizon model of decision making [4] was adopted because we are
interested in the long-term performance of agents; a ﬁnite horizon
model may lead to erratic behaviour as the last time-step approaches.
However, there are still two ways to model the agents’ decisions: by
using average reward per unit time or by discounting future rewards;
the former was chosen, since it simpliﬁes the decision analysis.
￿ If several agents arrive at a CT square at the same time, one of them is
arbitrarily deemed to be in charge.
[1] Each agent arrives at a square. If its goal
is attained it receives reward and updates
its goal.
[2] If the agent finds a CT at the square it
becomes AiC and decides to use CM = (t,p),
say. If t > 0 it must wait t time-steps
then broadcasts a request for coordination.
[3] If a request for coordination is received,
each agent decides on and submits its bid;
if successful it adopts CT as new goal as
does the AiC. If no suitable bids arrive,
AiC returns to step [2].
[4] Each agent decides on its next move accord-
ing to its current goal and all agents make
their move simultaneously.
Figure 2. Protocol for agents at each time-step.
All the agents in this scenario are assumed to be essentially co-
operative though self-interested. However, to model the fact that this
may not always be the case, we introduce the concept of an agent’s
willingness to cooperate (WtC); this factor,
￿, represents the weight
an agent puts on opting to cooperate rather than collect its usual re-
ward. When reward units, effectively the agent’s utility, are of equal
currency, a neutral agent only needs to receive the same reward from
a CT as it would from its ST; this corresponds to a WtC factor of
￿
￿
￿. The decision procedures described in this section will as-
sume that agents are neutral but will include
￿ to indicate where this
factor comes into the calculations.
There are four types of decisions that agents are required to make:
the direction to move in; which CM to adopt, if any; how much to bid
when a request for coordination is received; and, how to determine
which bid to accept, if any.
3.1 Deciding on the direction of movement
An agent always has a target square in which its current goal is lo-
cated. The agent decides to move towards its goal by selecting the
direction, up, down, left, or right, probabilistically according to the
ratio of up/down to left/right squares away from the goal it is.
For example, if an agent’s ST is located
￿ squares up and
￿ squares
to its right, then with probability
￿
￿ it will move up, and with proba-
bility
￿
￿ it will move right.
3.2 Deciding which CM to use
An agent which, en route to its ST, encounters a CT, must decide
whether to initiate coordination with another agent in order to per-
form it. To do this, the agent must determine whether there is any
advantage in so doing. This depends not only on the reward that is
being offered, but also on the CMs available, as well as various envi-
ronmental factors which affect the expected demands of the potential
coordinating agents.
To model the expected demands of the other agents, the AiC as-
sumes that they are randomly distributed throughout the grid, and
that their STs are similarly distributed. Thus some agents may be
near the CT while others may be far away; likewise, for some agents
there would be a signiﬁcant deviation from their ST to reach to CT,
while others may be able to coordinate over the CT en route to theirown STs. The AiC assesses the possible CMs on the basis of how
long before the task can be performed (including both the set up time
and the average distance away each agent is situated), and of how
much reward it is likely to obtain after deducting the expected re-
ward requirement of the other agent (based on the amount of time it
must spend deviating from its path and the probability of success of
the CM).
The AiC uses all these factors to assess each CM in terms of the
amount of surplus reward it can expect, over and above what it ex-
pects to obtain during its normal course of operation, i.e., its own
average reward per time-step,
￿. The AiC selects the CM which will
maximise this surplus reward. Though this may not be a globally op-
timal criterion for deciding on which CM to use, it makes sense from
a self-interested agent’s point of view.
To formalise this decision procedure, consider an
￿
￿
￿ grid with
reward size
￿ for STs, and
￿ for CTs, a coordination mechanism,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, which costs
￿ time-steps to set up and has a proba-
bility of success
￿. In this grid-world of known size, the agent can
calculate the expected average distance (ave dist) away of any
randomly situated agent from the CT square, as well as the likely av-
erage deviation (ave dev) such agents would have to make to get
there. The AiC further assumes that all agents have similar average
rewards and WtC factors as its own. Though in reality such com-
mon knowledge may not always be available, an agent may be able
to build up a picture of its environment through past experience—
clearly it needs some means of handling the uncertainty and this as-
sumption is not an unreasonable preliminary approximation. Thus all
agents use the same average reward per time step:
￿
￿
￿
ave dist.
Based on these ﬁgures, the agent can assess the average surplus re-
ward from coordinating over the CT at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ using
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
First, it must estimate its own cost in terms of how long the CM will
take to set up and how long it expects to wait for another agent to
arrive. Since the AiC would usually expect to receive
￿ reward units
per time-step, the cost of
￿
￿
￿ is given by:
cost
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ave dist
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Second, the AiC must estimate the average amount of reward the
other agents will require:
ave bid
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ave dev
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Using these estimates, the AiC can evaluate the expected surplus re-
ward of
￿
￿
￿:
ave surplus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿cost
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ave bid
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Note that the null CM is deﬁned to have zero surplus.
When deciding which CM to adopt, the agent computes its ex-
pected surplus reward from each of them and selects that CM which
maximises this value. If the surplus associated with all CMs is nega-
tive, the agent adopts the outside option of the null CM.
By means of illustration consider the scenario ofﬁgure 1.An agent
occupies a
￿
￿
￿ grid and ﬁnds a CT with
￿
￿
￿at square
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Assume all agents have a WtC factor of
￿
￿
￿ . The average distance
of other agents from
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿. Since the average distance between
two random squares is
￿
￿
￿, the average deviation of any agent is
￿.
Assume that each ST has a reward
￿
￿
￿ , then the average reward
per time-step of all agents is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. The expected surplus
reward of adopting a
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is given by:
ave surplus
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3.3 Deciding how much to bid
When agents receive a request to coordinate they submit a bid based
on the amount of reward that they would require to compensate them
for deviating from their ST. They also submit their current distance
away from the CT square
5. The agents’ bids are also affected by their
WtCfactor; taking thisinto account, their bids are based on maintain-
ing the amount of reward they would normally expect to receive fac-
tored by
￿. Other inﬂuences on their required reward are the amount
of time spent in deviating to the CT square, their average reward per
time-step and the probability of success of the CM being proposed.
To formalise this, consider an agent, A
￿, with
￿
￿ and average re-
ward per time-step
￿
￿. The agent calculates its deviation, i.e., the
number of extra time-steps it requires to reach its ST if it goes via
the CT square. Note that if, for example, the CT square lies directly
on a path to the ST, the agent’s deviation would be zero. Clearly, such
an agent will submit a very attractive bid, since the cost to coordinate
is effectively zero.
Again by means of illustration consider the agents depicted in ﬁg-
ure 1.
￿
￿ at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ would take
￿ time-steps to reach
￿
￿
￿ at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
directly, but
￿ steps going via the
￿
￿ at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, a deviation of
￿ time-
steps. However,
￿
￿ at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ would take
￿ time-steps to reach
￿
￿
￿ at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ directly, and also
￿ steps going via the
￿
￿ at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿;
￿
￿ there-
fore has a deviation of
￿.
To compute the reward A
￿ requires from engaging in coordination
over the CT, it must be compensated both for its deviation and for
the possibility that the CM might fail; it also takes into account its
willingness to cooperate:
bid
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ deviation
￿
￿
￿
This formula illustrates how the WtC factor inﬂuences an agent. If
￿
￿
￿ it can be described as greedy, asking for more reward than
it would normally expect to receive; if
￿
￿
￿ it can be described
as self-less, asking for less than it would normally expect to receive;
and, if
￿
￿
￿it is neutral, asking only to be compensated for what it
normally expects to receive.
The agent submits its bid to coordinate and its distance from the
CT square. If an agent is selected to coordinate, it adopts the CT
as its current goal. Its ST is only readopted after the CT has been
accomplished; in particular, if it should arrive at the ST square en
route for the CT, it does not receive its reward until it returns there.
3.4 Deciding which bid to accept
Once the AiC has received bids from all agents it selects that one
which maximises its surplus reward, given the new (ﬁrm) informa-
tionithas received. Foreach agent,
￿
￿,the AiCknows thetime itwill
take to arrive (
￿
￿) and the amount of reward it will require (bid
￿
￿).
The surplus reward is given by:
surplus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ bid
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Now, it may be the case that no bids are received which give a pos-
itive surplus. Even though the chosen CM had an expected surplus,
by chance it may be that no agents are sufﬁciently near to provide
reasonable bids. In such a situation the AiC returns to step [2] of the
protocol (ﬁgure 2) since, although it has been unlucky, its state is es-
sentially unchanged and attempting to coordinate again is still likely
to produce a surplus.
￿ In reality, agents could lie about both of these values. However, such strate-
gic behaviour would not affect the basic decision making processes as they
are described here. Thus, at this time, we assume agents bid truthfully.4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section provides an empirical evaluation of the key facets of our
decision making framework. The following parameters were ﬁxed
for all the experiments: duration (10,000 time units), number of CTs
in the grid at any one time (1), number of agents (5) and ST reward
(1). The experimental variables were the size of the grid, the reward
for CTs, the willingness to cooperate factor and the CMs themselves.
Results are shown by averaging ﬁgures over 10 runs.
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
2 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
7 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
8 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
9 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1
10 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1
Figure 3. Terrain map showing where the CMs are selected.
The ﬁrst experiments sought to show that the agents would in-
deed choose different coordination mechanisms in different situa-
tions. Figure 3 shows the results of which CMs were selected in
which grid position. The grid size was 20x20 (the remaining three
quadrants are simply a mirror of the portion that is shown and so
they are omitted for reasons of space), the reward for CTs is 10, and
the agents had the following CMs at their disposal: CM1(0, 0.6),
CM2(15, 0.7), CM3(30, 0.8), CM4 (45, 0.9) and CM5 (60, 1.0). In
the centre of the grid
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, the agents choose CMs that minimise
the set up cost (even though they have a signiﬁcant chance of fail-
ing to ensure coordination). However, as the agents move further
away from the centre, so they increasingly prefer mechanisms that
are more likely to succeed (even though they have a correspondingly
higher set up cost). The explanation for this behaviour is that as the
distance from the centre increases, so the expected time for another
agent to reach the CT square increases. Thus, to justify its choice of
a CT over its ST, the AiC needs to ensure that the cooperations it
does enter into do succeed. Whereas, towards the centre of the grid,
the time the AiC typically has to wait for another agent to arrive is
much smaller and so it can afford to have more cooperations fail.
In-between are the points where success and set up time are traded
off.
The second set of experiments show that the key determining fac-
tor of the amount of cooperation that occurs is the size of the grid.
Figure 4 shows that once the reward for CTs is sufﬁciently high
(above 5 in this case) then CTs always get initiated. Hence increasing
the reward beyond this ﬁgure has no effect. Similarly, ﬁgure 5 shows
that the system utility (sum of all the agents’ utilities) decreases as
the grid size increases. Again this is simply because the agents have
less opportunity to engage in CTs.
Finally, ﬁgure 6 shows the effect of the WtC factor (the reward
for CTs is again taken to be 10). As expected, the more greedy the
agents become (increasing
￿), the fewer the number of CTs that get
initiatedand achieved. Thiseffect becomes more marked for the CMs
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
12345 1 0 1 5 2 0 2 5 3 0
Cooperative Task Reward
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
T
a
s
k
s
A
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
50x50
45x45
40x40
35x35
30x30
25x25
20x20
15x15
10x10
5x5
Figure 4. Number of Cooperative Tasks achieved using CM(0,1.0).
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
5x5 10x10 15x15 20x20 25x25 30x30 35x35 40x40 45x45 50x50
Size Grid
System
Utility
CT reward 50
CT reward 45
CT reward 40
CT reward 35
CT reward 30
CT reward 25
CT reward 20
CT reward 15
CT reward 10
CT reward 5
Figure 5. System Utility obtained using CM(0,1.0).0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3
Willingness factor
Number
of
CT
s
achieved
CM (0, 0.6)
CM (15, 0.75)
CM (30, 0.8)
CM(45, 0.9)
CM(60, 1.0)
Figure 6. Willingness to Cooperate.
that take longer to set up (because the high set up cost acts as a dis-
incentive to initiate CTs).
5 RELATED WORK
The majority of previous work on coordination in multi-agent sys-
tems has assumed that it is a design time problem (e.g., [8, 9, 3]).
Thus, the designer analyses the system’s coordination needs, selects
a single coordination mechanism to satisfy these needs, and then im-
poses this choice upon the individual agents and the overall system.
This modus operandi also lies at the heart of mechanism design for
multi-agent systems [7]. Here the system designer develops the in-
teraction mechanism (protocol), in order to fulﬁll particular design
objectives, and the agents’ decision making behaviours are optimised
with respect to the imposed protocol.
The downside of such approaches are that they do not enable an
agent to tailor its coordination requirements to its prevailing circum-
stances. However, as agents are increasingly being used in open and
dynamic environments, greaterﬂexibilityis needed. To this end, Dur-
fee [2] has argued that agents need the ﬂexibility to coordinate at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction, depending upon their particular needs at
a given moment in time. To date, however, this work has focused on
building such ﬂexibility into the basic planning mechanisms of the
individual agents. As yet, there are no structures or mechanisms for
explicitly reasoning about which level to coordinate at in a given sit-
uation. Such ﬂexibility was also built into cooperative problem solv-
ing agents by Jennings [6]. Here, agents could choose to cooperate
according to various conventions which dictated how they should be-
have in a particular team problem solving context. These conventions
varied in terms of the time they took to establish and the commu-
nication overhead they imposed upon the agents. However, again,
there was no reasoning mechanism for determining which conven-
tion was appropriate for a given situation. Boutilier [1] presents a
decision making framework, based on multi-agent Markov decision
processes, that does reason about the state of a coordination mecha-
nism. However, his work is concerned with optimal reasoning within
the context of a given coordination mechanism, rather than actually
reasoning about which mechanism to employ in a particular situa-
tion.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has argued that autonomous agents need to be given the
ﬂexibility to dynamically select the mechanism they use for coordi-
nating their actions during collaborative problem solving. Moreover,
a formal framework for representing such reasoning has been devel-
oped and illustrated in a simple grid-world scenario. Although the
speciﬁcs of the decision procedures are clearly related to our par-
ticular grid-world scenario, we believe that the basic processes and
structures we have developed are suitable for reasoning about coordi-
nation mechanisms in more general domains. Moreover, the key as-
pects of our model have been evaluated empirically in order to show
their effect on both the individual agents and on the overall system.
For the future, we aim to generalise and extend the reasoning the
agents perform about theirchoice of coordination mechanism. In par-
ticular, we will introduce greater heterogeneity both in the agent pop-
ulation and in the coordination mechanisms available, examine the
effects of different types of commitment to the cooperative tasks, and
use reinforcement learning to enable agents to adapt to their current
environment as a substitute for the common knowledge assumption.
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